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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota's economic loss doctrine exists, together with products li-
ability law, at the crossroads of tort and contract.' It determines whether
various tort claims are available to recover for economic losses or, alterna-2
tively, if claims for such losses are limited to contract. One persistent
problem in applying the economic loss doctrine is determining which tort
claims are foreclosed. Although devised in response to strict liability in
tort,3 the economic loss doctrine soon precluded negligence claims as
1. See Jonathan M. Bye & Eric J. Peck, New Windows on Tort Claims: Minne-
sota's Economic Loss Doctrine, BENCH & B. MINN., May/June 1988, at 41, 41; Mike
Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law and the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 122 n.725 (1998)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILnY § 21 cmt. a (Proposed
Final Draft, Apr. 1, 1997). Minnesota Supreme Court Associate Justice Lawrence
R. Yetka stated the following in his dissent in Hapka v. Paquin Farms.
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature
of the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest
in freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which
give rise to them are imposed by law, and are based primarily on social
policy, and not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties. They
may be owed to all those within the range of harm, or to some consider-
able class of people. Contract actions are created to protect the interest
in having promises performed. Contract obligations are imposed be-
cause of conduct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to
the specific individuals named in the contract.
458 N.W.2d 683, 689 (Minn. 1990) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF TORTS, § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971)).
2. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn.
1992).
The courts have not had an easy time in determining the appropriate in-
terplay between tort and contract remedies for losses caused by a defec-
tive product. The critical problem has been to find some principled basis
for deciding when breach of warranty lies exclusively and when the tort
remedies of negligence and strict liability may apply also.
Id.
3. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965) ('The history
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well.4 Moreover, broad language in some cases even seemed to indicate
that the economic loss doctrine barred all tort claims, including fraud and5
negligent misrepresentation . The Minnesota Supreme Court, however,
6
has not yet specifically addressed this question.7
Recently, in AKA Distributing Co. v. Whirlpool Corp.,7 the Eighth Circuit
weighed in on this issue, holding that "in a suit between merchants, a
fraud claim to recover economic losses must be independent of the
[U.C.C.] Article 2 contract or it is precluded by the economic loss doc-
trine."8 More recently, in a special session called to assist Minnesota-based
Marvin Windows in its lawsuit against PPG Industries, Inc., the Minnesota9
Legislature amended Minnesota's economic loss doctrine statute to allow
fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims to survive the economic
loss doctrine.'l Although these amendments did not help Marvin Win-11
dows in its litigation, the amendments represent a potentially significant
of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to un-
dermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial
Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries."). The Seely
court established the economic loss doctrine. See id. at 149-50.
4. See id. at 151 (stating, in dicta, that "[e]ven in actions for negligence, a
manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no
recovery for economic loss alone"); see also Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp
Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) ("[E]conomic losses that arise out of
commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to
other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict
products liability.").
5. See, e.g., ETM Graphics, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, No. C2-91-2103, 1992 WL
61394, at *2, *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1992); Nelson Distrib., Inc. v. Stewart-
Warner Indus. Balancers, 808 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Minn. 1992) (relying on ETM
Graphics in ascertaining how the Minnesota Supreme Court would act).
6. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir.
1998) ("[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed whether the eco-
nomic loss doctrine bars fraud and misrepresentation torts.").
7. 137 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998).
8. Id. at 1087.
9. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2, 1998 Minn. Laws 2322
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.10).
10. See id. § 1 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.10(e)). The
amendment was approved on April 22, 1998 to have effect the following day, and
to apply to actions pending or commenced after that date. See id. § 4.
11. See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738,
743-44 (D. Minn. 1999), argued, No. 99-1424 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999). The Marvin
court found that the amendments made for Marvin Windows in the 1998 special
session applied only to transactions governed by Minnesota Statutes section
604.10. See id. Because the transactions between Marvin Windows and PPG oc-
curred before enactment of Minnesota Statutes section 604.10, those transactions
were governed by the previously existing common law economic loss doctrine of
Minnesota. See id. Consequently, the Marvin court avoided any need to find ret-
roactive application of the 1998 amendments unconstitutional, as recommended
1999] 1503
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change to Minnesota's economic loss doctrine.
This casenote analyzes Minnesota's economic loss doctrine as it per-
tains to fraud and misrepresentation claims. First, it presents a historical
development of the economic loss doctrine. Second, it analyzes the ap-
proaches to fraud and misrepresentation claims taken recently by the
Eighth Circuit in AKA and the Minnesota Legislature in response to the
Marvin litigation. Third, it explains that the AKA approach is needed to
supplement the recent amendments by the Minnesota Legislature.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Overview of Policies Underlying the Economic Loss Doctrine
The law of products liability, including its twin theories of negli-12 13
gence and strict liability, was developed to protect consumers from the
risk of personal injury without imposing the stringent privity, notice, and
disclaimer requirements of contract law.' 4  Conversely, the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") was developed to provide a comprehensive
commercial code that allows parties to negotiate and allocate risks, such as
through disclaimers that limit liability.1
by the magistrate judge. See id.; see also Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., Civ. No. 4-95-739 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1998) (Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Judge Erickson).
12. See generally, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)
(holding, in Judge Cardozo's often-cited opinion, that lack of privity of contract
did not bar the plaintiffs negligence action against the manufacturer); see also
Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331 (1892). Professor Michael K. Steenson
points out that Minnesota's Schubert decision presaged Judge Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson by some twenty-four years. See Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of
Products Liability in Minnesota: The Theories of Recovery, 6 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 1, 9
(1980).
13. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77, 83, 97
(NJ. 1960) (adopting strict liability in tort). The Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted strict liability in 1967. See Steenson, supra note 12, at 5 n.9 (citing
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (addressing
a child that was scalded by water from a vaporizer that had been tipped over)).
14. See Steenson, supra note 12, at 122.
15. "Minnesota adopted the U.C.C. in 1965; it became effective July 1, 1966."
Olsen-Frankman Livestock Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Madelia, 605
F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1979). "'Minnesota has adopted the most liberal privity
position available in the U.C.C.'" TCF Bank & Sav., F.A. v. Marshall Truss Sys.,
Inc., 466 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Nelson v. International
Harvester Corp., 394 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)). See MINN. STAT. §
336.2-318 (1998) ("A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.").
1504 [Vol. 25
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The economic loss doctrine precludes certain tort remedies, in a
commercial sale of goods, for purely economic losses unless accompanied
by (1) physical injury or (2) damage to property other than the purchased
good itself.16 Recovery for such economic losses is limited to the terms of
an underlying contract." Like both products liability and the U.C.C., the
economic loss doctrine recognizes that commercial parties and consumers
present different policy considerations requiring cost allocation and cost
shifting, respectively. 19
Removing tort remedies for economic losses19 arising from commer-
cial sales of goods forces commercial parties to allocate risk through con-
tract negotiations, as provided by U.C.C. Article 2.20 The resulting price
should reflect the cost allocation of such risks; neither party should obtain
a windfall that it did not bargain for in negotiating the underlying con-
21
tract.
16. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.
1981).
17. See id. The economic loss rule can alternatively be expressed in terms of
what recovery is allowed, rather than what recovery is precluded. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrS LIABILITY § 21 (1998) (defining "Harm to Persons or
Property: Recovery for Economic Loss"). "For the purposes of this Restatement,
harm to persons or property includes economic loss if caused by harm to: (a) the
plaintiff's person; or (b) the person of another when harm to the other interferes
with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort law; or (c) the plaintiff's property
other than the defective product itself." Id.
18. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d
431, 433 (Minn. 1985). "The U.C.C. was enacted to govern and clarify the rights
and remedies of parties to commercial transactions. As part of its risk allocation
scheme, it permits parties to limit and modify by contract the remedies available
for commercial losses." Id.
19. "Economic loss has been defined.., to be direct, incidental, or conse-
quential pecuniary loss, including, but not limited to, damage to the product in
question, and nonphysical damage to property other than the product." 4A
AMERicAN LAw OF PRODucrS LIABILITY, § 60:36 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1991). "Economic loss" was defined by the Minnesota Supreme Court as that
loss "resulting from the failure of the product to perform to the level expected by
the buyer, commonly measured by the cost of repairing or replacing the product
and the consequent loss of profits, or by the diminution in value of the product
because it does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured
and sold." Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, 354
N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Minn. 1984).
20. See, e.g., Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir.
1990). In Miller, Judge Posner stated that commercial disputes ought to be re-
solved by commercial law rather than tort principles designed for accidents that
cause personal injury or property damage. See id. "A disputant should not be
permitted to opt out of commercial law by refusing to avail himself of the oppor-
tunities which that law gives him." Id.; see also Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d
683, 688 (Minn. 1990).
21. See SJ. Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 434.
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Consumer transactions, on the other hand, are typically character-
ized by both unequal bargaining power and the inability to negotiate
meaningfully.2 2 Because consumer transactions lack negotiated risk allo-
cation, consumers may recover in strict liability in tort, without establish-
ing fault, for personal injury and damage to other property resulting from
23
unreasonably dangerous products. Consumer transactions require strict
liability to shift costs from the consumer to the manufacturer because the
manufacturer is able to insure against the risk of injur74 and allocate the
resulting expense over a large population of consumers.
The economic loss doctrine stands uneasy guard as the gatekeeper
for tort recovery even for transactions that are not so easily categorized as
25
purely consumer or commercial. More importantly, if both contract and
The commercial buyer can protect himself by negotiation. He can in-
duce the seller to accept, for a price, risks which the buyer cannot bear
efficiently himself. Conversely, by relieving the seller of responsibility for
product defects, the commercial buyer is likely to obtain the product at a
lower price. When a buyer who has taken advantage of that opportunity
invokes strict products liability with respect to a risk that was allocated to
him by contract, he in effect asks the law to accord him a better bargain
than he purchased.
Id. (quoting Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir.
1982)); see a/soJacquelyn K. Brunmeier, Death by Footnote: The Life and Times of Min-
nesota's Economic Loss Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 871, 898 (1993); 2
MARSHALL S. SHAPo, THE LAw OF PRODUcrs LIABILY, 27.03[1] (3d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 1998) (noting that strict liability is unsuited for commercial parties having
comparable bargaining power and the ability to make cost judgments, particularly
where the goods are specialized or customized--such parties have a duty to allo-
cate risk through contractual negotiations).
22. See SJ. Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 433 (noting that "individual consumers lack
the bargaining power to avoid accepting contracts that unfairly limit their reme-
dies"); Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688 ("Generally speaking, a consumer has neither
the skill nor the bargaining power to negotiate either warranties or remedies.").
By contrast, "the law is entitled to expect the parties to commercial transactions to
be knowledgeable and of relatively equal bargaining power so that warranties can
be negotiated to the parties' mutual advantage." Id.
23. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 866-67 (1986).
24. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 690 (Yetka, J., dissenting). "The primary bur-
den of the law of products liability is imposed on sellers and manufacturers be-
cause they are in a better position to minimize or eliminate the risk of losses
caused by defective products." Id.
25. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 16-17
(Minn. 1992) (dividing commercial transactions into those involving merchants
and those involving merchants in goods of the kind, and applying the economic
loss doctrine to preclude tort claims only by merchants in goods of the kind). See
alsoJennie-O Foods, Inc. v. Safe-Glo Prods. Corp., 582 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Minn. Ct.
[Vol. 251506
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/13
AKA DISTRIBUTING CO. V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.
tort claims exist, recovery often rests entirely on the economic loss doc-
trine in cases where a statute of limitations precludes recovery on the con-
tract claims. The limitation period for a contract claim of breach of war-
ranty is four years, triggered by the seller's delivery of the goods, while the
limitation period for a negligence claim is six years, and does not begin to
run until an injury occurs. Where a negligence claim remains viable af-
ter a contract claim expires, a plaintiff must negotiate the labyrinthine in-
App. 1998) (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals differ in their interpretations of whether "commercial transac-
tions" applies to all merchants or only to merchants in goods of the kind).
26. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-725 (1998). The statute provides:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less
than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty ex-
plicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the
breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action ac-
crues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection
(1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for
the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expira-
tion of the time limited and within six months after the termination of
the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discon-
tinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling the statute of limita-
tions, nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this
chapter becomes effective.
The limitations in this section do not apply to actions for the breach of
any contract for sale of a grain storage structure or other goods that are
incorporated into an improvement to real property, except equipment
and machinery. These actions are subject only to the statute of limita-
tions set forth in section 541.051.
This section does not apply to claims against sellers of goods for damages to prop-
erty caused by the goods where the property that is damaged is not the goods and the
sale is not a sale between parties who are each merchants in goods of the kind.
Id. (emphasis added); see also MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subds. 1(1), 1(2), 1(6) & 2
(1998) (providing a six year limitation period for contract claims outside the
U.C.C. and for negligence, a four year limitation period for strict liability, and a six
year limitation period for fraud, the period accruing after discovery of the facts
constituting the fraud); see also Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 16.
15071999]
7
Arora: Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims under Minnesota'a Ec
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tricacies of the economic loss doctrine to recover any economic losses.
B. Early Roots: Santor and Seely
The competing policies of products liability law and the U.C.C. were
considered in 1965 in the New Jersey case of Santor v. A & M Karagheu-
sian, Inc.27 Santor allowed recovery under the tort theory of strict liability28
for a purely economic loss, without personal injury, for defective carpet-
ing that was represented to be Grade No. 1 carpeting.2 This was consis-
tent with some early Minnesota cases allowing tort recovery for economic
losses irrespective of whether such losses were accompanied by personal
. . 30
injury.
Later in 1965, the California Supreme Court reached the opposite
result in Seely v. White Motor Co., giving birth to the economic loss doc-
trine. In Seely, the plaintiff purchased a truck for his business of heavy-
32 33
duty hauling. A defective suspension caused violent bouncing resulting34
in the plaintiffs loss of the truck's use during multiple repairs. Failed
brakes resulted in the truck overturning, for which the plaintiff incurred
repair costs but suffered no personal injury.35
The plaintiffs claims against the defendant truck manufacturer in-
36
cluded both a contract claim for breach of warranty and tort claims of
negligence 37 and strict liability. 3 The Seely court allowed damages under
the breach of warranty claim for the plaintiffs lost profits and payments
27. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). The Santor decision was never widely followed
and was recently severely limited, if not overruled by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. See 2 SHAPO, supra note 21, 1 27.02[1] [a] (citing Alloway v. General Marine
Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 267 (N.J. 1997), which allowed no tort recovery for in-
jury only to a defective pleasure boat itself).
28. See Santor, 207 N.W.2d. at 311-12.
29. See id. at 306.
30. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162-63
(Minn. 1981) (Yetka,J., dissenting) (citing Nieman v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co.,
127 N.W. 394 (Minn. 1910) (allowing retailer to recover damages from wholesaler
for lost profits resulting from contaminated cooking oil); Ellis v. Lindmark, 117
Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (Minn. 1929) (allowing recovery for economic damages
to plaintiffs poultry business resulting from mislabeling of raw linseed oil)).
31. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
32. See id. at 147.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 148.
35. See id. at 147.
36. See id. at 148-49.
37. See id. at 152.
38. See id. at 149-52.
[Vol. 251508
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on the purchase price of the truck.39 Because the plaintiff failed to prove
that the suspension defect caused the truck to overturn, the plaintiff's
negligence claim for the accident repair costs failed for lack of causa-
tion. As a result, recovery for the accident repair costs turned exclusively
on the plaintiffs strict liability claim. However, the Seely court refused to
allow recovery under either strict liability or negligence for the purely
economic loss without accompanying physical harm or damage to other41
property. The Seely decision attempted to ensure that manufacturers
make products that are not so unreasonably dangerous as to cause physi-
42
cal harm to consumers. Seely did not hold the manufacturer responsible
for the level of performance of the products in the buyer's business unless
the manufacturer agrees that the product was designed to meet the
buyer's demands.43
C. Minnesota Adopts the Economic Loss Doctrine: Superwood
It was not until 1981 that the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the
economic loss doctrine in Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.4 In Super-
wood, the plaintiff purchased a hot plate press that operated properly for
twenty-one years until a cylinder failed.45 Three years later, the plaintiff
sued for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and breach of con-
39. See id. at 148.
40. See id. at 152.
41. See id. at 151-52. The Seely court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS section 402A as limiting strict liability to physical harm to a person or prop-
erty. See id. at 151. In dissent, Justice Peters complained that the majority's state-
ments applying the economic loss doctrine to strict liability were mere dicta. See
id. at 153 (Peters, J., dissenting). This criticism seems ill-founded; strict liability
was addressed because the plaintiffs negligence claim failed for lack of causation.
See supra text accompanying note 40. Application of the economic loss doctrine to
negligence, however, did indeed constitute dicta because the negligence claim
had already been resolved. See id.; see also Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,
311 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Minn. 1981). Nevertheless, since Superwood, Minnesota
courts have consistently applied the economic loss doctrine to both negligence
and strict liability claims, as discussed infra.
42. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
43. See id. The Seely rule has been widely followed. See 2 SHAPO, supra note 21,
27.02[2] [d] (citing cases from Illinois, New York and Minnesota that sided with
Seely). The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Seely approach in an admiralty case,
which further promoted its widespread acceptance. See East River Steamship
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); see also Christopher Scott
D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law From Drowning in
a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 591, 593, 609-19 (1995) (surveying the nature
of any economic loss rules in each state).
44. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
45. See id. at 160.
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tract, seeking recovery for damage to the press and for lost profits." Be-
cause the plaintiff's breach of warranty and contract claims were time-
barred, recovery rested entirely on the viability of the plaintiffs tort
claims.47 The Superwood court held, however, that "economic losses that
arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving [1] personal
injury or [2] damage to other property, are not recoverable under the tort
theories of negligence or strict product liability."48 The Superwood court
reasoned that allowing unrestrained tort liability in commercial transac-
tions would totally emasculate the liability limitations, warranty disclaim-
ers, and notice provisions of the U.C.C. 49 The Superwood decision did not50
extend the economic loss doctrine to consumer transactions or to tort
theories other than negligence and strict liability."
D. The "Other Property" Exception: Fine Arts
In 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the "other prop-
erty" exception to the economic loss doctrine in Minneapolis Society of Fine
Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates Architects, Inc.5" The Fine Arts plaintiff pur-
chased 1.8 million glazed bricks that later deteriorated because of im-
proper building design. 5' The plaintiff claimed breach of express and
implied warranty, breach of contract, negligence, and strict liability for the
defendant brick company's failure to warn the p aintiff or its agents of
technical considerations in installing the brick. The Fine Arts court
found that the plaintiff failed to establish physical damage to property
46. See id.
47. See id. at 160 & n.1.
48. Id. at 162.
49. See id.
50. See id. The Superwood court stated:
"The laws of warranty still meet the needs of commercial transactions and
function well in a commercial setting .... However, the Restatement the-
ory of responsibility [strict liability] more adequately meets the public
policy need to protect consumers from the inevitable risks of bodily harm
created by mass production and complex marketing conditions...."
Limiting the application of strict products liability to consumers' actions
or actions involving personal injury will allow the U.C.C. to satisfy the
needs of the commercial sector and still protect the legitimate expecta-
tions of consumers.
Id. (quoting Farr v. Armstrong Rubber, 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
51. See supra text accompanying note 48.
52. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984).
53. See id. at 818-19.
54. See id. at 817, 819.
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other than the brick itself.55 If buildings constituted "other property," Su-
perwood would effectively be overruled as to every seller of basic building
materials (e.g., concrete, brick or steel) because the "other property" ex-
ception would always apply.56 According to Fine Arts, the "U.C.C. provi-
sions as applicable to component suppliers would be totally emasculated"
by such a finding.5 7 Consequently, the Fine Arts court sided with other ju-
risdictions holding that "where a defect in a component part damaged the
product into which that component was incorporated, economic losses to
the product as a whole [are] not losses to 'other property' and therefore
not recoverable." 5 As with Superwood, the Fine Arts court limited the eco-
nomic loss doctrine's reach to the torts of negligence and strict liability.59
E. The "Personal Injury" Exception: S.J. Groves
In 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the "personal in-
jury" exception to the economic loss doctrine in S.J Groves & Sons Co. v.
Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp.60 In S.J Groves, the plaintiff highway construc-
tion contractor alleged that a fatigue failure in a helicopter's pitch control
unit caused the helicopter to crash, 61 killing the pilot, injuring a passen-
ger, and destroying communication accessories that the plaintiff had pur-
62
chased separately and installed in the helicopter. The pilot's heirs
brought and settled a wrongful death action against the helicopter manu-
63
facturer, alleging negligence and strict liability. The plaintiff construc-
tion contractor sought recovery for "damage to the helicopter, loss of use,
lost profits, and other incidental and consequential damages, under theo-
ries of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability."
65
The S.J Groves court denied recovery, where the warranty claim was
time-barred, 66 finding that the economic loss doctrine precluded the tort
55. See id. at 820.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 822.
60. 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985).
61. See id. at 432.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 435 (answering the question certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court by the United States District Court, District of Minnesota, in the negative).
66. See id. at 432 (assuming facts in accordance with the defendant's answer).
Because this case responded only to the questions certified by the federal court,
this precise issue was not before the court. See id. at 433.
15111999]
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67
claims. The court noted that "although personal injuries arose from the
same occurrence, [plaintiff was] seeking economic loss arising only fromS, ,,68
the damage to the product itself, not from the personal injury. Moreo-
ver, under Fine Arts, the damage to the plaintiff's communication accesso-
ries was insufficient to bootstrap the plaintiff's much larger claims for
damages to the helicopter itself under the "other property" exception to
the economic loss doctrine.6 9 Thus, after S.J Groves, the "personal injury"
and "other property" exceptions to the economic loss doctrine are com-70
pletely separate and independent threshold tests. A plaintiff may re-
cover only for those economic losses associated with the particular thresh-
old (i.e., "personal injury" or "other property") that is satisfied."
7 1
SJ. Groves also considered whether Minnesota should follow other ju-
risdictions in resolving the conflict between tort and contract by distin-
guishing between losses resulting from a "qualitative defect," for which
only contract remedies are available, and those resulting from a "sudden
72
and calamitous occurrence" for which recovery in tort is also allowed.
67. See id. at 433, 435 (citing Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311
N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981)).
68. Id. at 433. Employers may also be barred from recovering for their eco-
nomic losses suffered as a consequence of injury to an employee. See Herbert
Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 AM. J.
COMp. L. 111, 113 (Supp. 1998).
69. See S.J Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 434 n.2.
70. Cf Bye & Peck, supra note 1, at 42. "The Court thus clarified the 'damage
to other property' exception to the doctrine to apply only where economic losses
arise out of personal injury or damage to other property." Id. Justice Scott dis-
sented in S.J Groves, arguing that courts should remedy economic losses for dam-
age to other property whenever personal injury arises from the same occurrence.
See S.J. Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 436 (Scott, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scott,
the "requirement that there be damage to other property or personal injury is
simply a shorthand way of determining whether a defect is part of the 'accident
problem' against which tort law seeks to protect." Id.
71. See S.J. Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 435-36 (Scott, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 435. S.J Groves explained:
This "violent occurrence" distinction stems from Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965), which provides for recovery for physical harm
caused by a "product in defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer," and resolution turns on "whether the safety-
insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-bargain protection of war-
ranty law is most applicable to a particular claim." Accordingly, damage
to the product itself caused by a "qualitative defect" is recoverable only
under the U.C.C. and contract law, whereas recovery in tort is allowed for
damage to the product arising from a "sudden and calamitous occur-
rence."
Id. (internal citations omitted) (listing cases using the sudden and calamitous dis-
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The S. Groves court rejected any such distinction as imprecise and arbi-
trary. Thus, Minnesota's economic loss doctrine does not depend on
whether the occurrence is sudden, violent, or calamitous.74
F. Defining Commercial Transactions: Valley Farmers' and McCarthy
Well.
As originally adopted in Superwood, the economic loss doctrine rested
on preventing "emasculation" of Article 2 of the U.C.C.75 However, Arti-
cle 2 of the U.C.C. applies only to sales of goods, and not to the delivery of
services. In 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Valley Farmers'
Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Co. 76 and McCarthy Well Co. Inc. v. St. Peter Creamery,
Inc.,77 and explained which of Superwood's "commercial transactions"7 8 fall
within the purview of the economic loss doctrine.
In Valley Farmers, the plaintiff purchased a negative flow aeration
grain drying and storage system. Five years after the purchase, the roof
and sides of the center bin collapsed as a result of a partial vacuum cre-
ated by the aeration fans when frost accumulated on exterior roof vents.so
The plaintiff asserted negligence with regard to the defendant's system
design services and its failure to warn, and strict liability for damage to the
bin itself.L Thus, the plaintiffs claims involved a transaction in both
goods and services.
In Valley Farmers, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the "pre-
tinction, and discussing the rationale underlying the distinction); see also Minnea-
polis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816,
821 (Minn. 1984); David E. Bland & Robert M. Watson, Property Damage Caused by
Defective Products: What Losses Are Recoverable?, 9 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1, 9 (1984)
(discussing cases requiring the loss to result from a dangerous defect, occurring
under circumstances that make the product unreasonably dangerous).
73. See S.J Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 435 (Minn. 1985). In dissent, Justice Scott
noted that, like the "personal injury" and "other property" exceptions to the eco-
nomic loss doctrine, the sudden and calamitous occurrence criteria is based on
the rationale that "tort law imposes a duty on manufacturers to produce safe
products, regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the hazard is on people,
other property, or the product itself." See id. at 436 (Scott,J., dissenting).
74. The sudden and calamitous failure exception to the economic loss rule
has been rejected by most states. See D'Angelo, supra note 43, at 601-19 (analyzing
decisions in each state for whether an "unduly dangerous condition" or "sudden
and calamitous failure" exception is applied to the economic loss doctrine).
75. See supra text accompanying note 49.
76. 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987).
77. 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
78. See supra text accompanying note 48.
79. See Valley Farmers, 398 N.W.2d at 554.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 555.
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dominant factor" test, under which the court must ascertain the primary
purpose of the contract at the time of sale to determine whether a hybrid82
contract is primarily for goods or services. "That some added service is
required to install or apply the product does not transform a contract of
sale into a contract for services."8 3 In Valley Farmers, only $120,000 of the
$504,000 contract price was attributed to labor.84 Moreover, none of the
labor was designated as compensation for design services, a factor indicat-
ing "the tangential and incidental nature of those services." s5 Thus, the
court in Valley Farmers' held that the transaction was a sale of goods for
which tort recovery was barred by the economic loss doctrine.,
6
In McCarthy Well, which was decided later in 1987, the defendant87
hired the plaintiff to restore an artesian well to its original capacity. This
restoration included inspecting the well by televised means, exploding dy-
namite and airlifting sand from the bottom of the well, and installing a
new turbine pump. After numerous pump failures, the defendant re-
fused to make complete payment on the contract and hired another com-89
pany to dig a new well and install a new pump. When the plaintiff sued
for breach of contract, defendant counterclaimed for negligent perform-
ance of the services.90
In McCarthy Well, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the scope
of "commercial transactions," for purposes of the economic loss doctrine,
is coextensive with those transactions governed by U.C.C. Article 2.91 The
court noted that the economic loss doctrine exists only to protect the
U.C.C. and is inapplicable when the U.C.C. does not apply. Because
only $8,329.45 of the $34,573.27 bill was identified as the cost of the
pump, the hybrid contract primarily provided services.93 Because the
U.C.C. did not apply to such services, the economic loss doctrine did not
82. See id. at 556; see also Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank of Min-
nesota, 518 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Minn. 1994) (applying the "predominant factor"
test).
83. Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 556.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 556-57.
87. See McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 313
(Minn. 1987).
88. See id. at 314.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 313.
91. See id. at 314-15. As adopted in Minnesota, the U.C.C. is codified at Min-
nesota Statutes chapter 336 (1998).
92. See McCarthy Well, 410 N.W.2d at 315.
93. See id.
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bar tort recovery on a negligence theory.
94
G. Revisiting "Other Property". Holstad and Hapka
In 1988, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again interpreted the
"other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine in Holstad v.
Southwestern Porcelain, Inc.95 In Holstad, the plaintiff purchased a prefabri-
cated silo.96 The defendant installed the silo and the plaintiff began stor-
ing feed in it.97 Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs cows became sick from eat-
ing feed that had spoiled due to a rupture in the silo's air bag.98
Defendant installed a replacement air bag but it also was ripped, probably
during installation. 99 As a result, the plaintiff continued to lose feed and
milk production.' °° The plaintiff sued for breach of express and implied
warranty and under tort theories of negligence and strict liability.' How-
ever, because four years had elapsed since delivery of the silo, the statute
of limitations barred the warranty claims.' °2 As a result, the plaintiff's re-
covery depended entirely on resolution of his tort claims.
In applying the "predominant factor" test of Valley Farmers', the Hol-
stad court concluded that the services rendered in installing the prefabri-
cated silo were even more minimal than those in Valley Farmers', making
this transaction predominantly a sale of goods rather than services.! As a
result, the plaintiff could not recover for economic losses unless his loss of
feed, livestock, and milk production constituted damage to "other prop-
erty" as contemplated by Superwood.1 4 The Holstad court concluded that
the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine applies only
where "the defect or damage is other than that which could ordinarily be
94. See id.
95. 421 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
96. See id. at 372.
97. See id. at 372-73.
98. See id. at 373.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 373-74. The plaintiff also claimed tolling of the limitations pe-
riod by defendant's fraudulent concealment of defendant's knowledge of the fact
that the air bag was torn. See id. at 374. "Fraudulent concealment, if it occurs, will
toll the running of the statute of limitations until discovery or reasonable oppor-
tunity for discovery of the cause of action by the exercise of due diligence." Id.
(citing Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 450, 234 N.W.2d 775, 795 (1975)). But the
Holstad court concluded that the plaintiff had not set forth sufficient facts to raise
a genuine issue of whether there was fraudulent concealment. See id. at 374-75.
103. See id. at 373-74.
104. See id. at 375.
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contemplated by the parties to a commercial transaction." °5 On that ba-
sis, the Holstad court denied the plaintiffs tort claims under the economic
loss doctrine, 106 implying that the silo was not "dangerous to an extent be-
yond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary purchaser who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristics."0 7
Again faced with the "other property" exception to the economic loss
doctrine in 1990 in Hapka v. Paquin Farms,'0 the Minnesota Supreme
Court completely eliminated the "other property" exception for commer-
cial transactions. In Hapka, the plaintiff purchased seed potatoes in-
fected with ring rot which, in turn, contaminated the plaintiffs planting
machinery." 0 As a result, the disease spread to the plaintiffs other fields
that were planted with seed potatoes from other suppliers" The plain-
tiff's claims included breach of express and implied warranty, misrepre-
sentation, negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability.n1
The Hapka court first recognized that the "other property" exception
had already been narrowly interpreted. It then found the "other prop-
erty" exception improper when applied to commercial, as opposed to
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 375 (quoting Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d
217, 222 (4th Cir. 1982)).
108. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
109. See id. at 688.
110. See id. at 685.
111. See id.
112. See Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 431 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
The trial court allowed the misrepresentation claim to be submitted to the jury.
See id. However, the trial court refused to submit the other tort theories to the jury
because of the economic loss doctrine. See id. at 910.
113. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 687 (citing Thofson v. Redex Indus., 433
N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)). In Thofson v. Redex Industries, the court
held that fire damage to grain from a defective dryer was within the ordinary con-
templation of parties to the commercial transaction, and minor damage to inci-
dental equipment was insufficient to bootstrap much larger claim for economic
losses. 433 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see also Holsad v. Southwest-
ern Porcelain, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding damage
to grain resulting in sick cows and diminished milk production was not beyond
ordinary contemplation, as required by the "other property" exception of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine); American Home Assur. Co. v. Major Tool & Mach., Inc., 767
F.2d 446, 447-48 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Minnesota law and finding the "other
property" exception inapplicable to damages to a single product fabricated under
a series of subcontracts); Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D.
Minn. 1985) (finding damage to grain resulting in sick cows was essentially based
on the failure of the product to perform as expected such that the "other prop-
erty" exception did not apply).
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consumer, transactions. 114 The Hapka court reasoned that the U.C.C. al-
ready provides consequential damages including those for "injury to per-
son or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."" 5
"Having negotiated the warranties and any limitations of liability, that a
defective product causes damage to other property should not defeat the
liability parameters the parties have set by opening the door to tort theo-
ries of recovery."" 6 The Hapka court held that the U.C.C. controls exclu-
sively for commercial transactions involving property damage without ac-117
companying physical injury, expressly overruling "any statement or
implication to the contrary in Superwood and its progeny.""" Thus, Hapka
eliminated the "other property" exception that accompanied the eco-
nomic loss doctrine since its adoption in Superwood.11
H. The Legislative Response to Hapka
In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature quickly overruled the 1990 Hapka
decision, effectively restoring the legitimacy of Superwood and its progeny.
Section 604.10 of the Minnesota Statutes codified the pre-Hapka economic
loss doctrine, providing:
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods that is due to
damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may be
recovered in tort as well as in contract, but economic loss that
arises from a sale of goods between parties who are each mer-
chants in goods of the kind is not recoverable in tort.
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods, between
merchants, that is not due to damage to tangible property other
than the goods sold may not be recovered in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section
does not include the economic loss due to damage to the goods
themselves. '20
The economic loss statute is poorly phrased. However, a close ex-
amination indicates that the statute divided the universe of potential
114. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 687-88.
115. Id. at 688 (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-715(2) (1988)).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Act of June 4, 1991, ch. 352, § 2, 1991 Minn. Laws 2792-93 (codified at
MIN. STAT. § 604.10 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
15171999]
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claimants into: (1) merchants in goods of the kind; (2) merchants; and
(3) everybody else (i.e., consumers).12' The statute also divided the uni-
verse of potential damages into: (1) damages for defects in the loods
themselves; and (2) damages for injury to other tangible property. Ta-
ble 1 illustrates operation of the economic loss statute according to its
plain language.123
TABLE 1: Operation of the Economic Loss Statute
Claimant Goods themselves Other tangible prop-
defective erty damaged
Merchants in goods Not recoverable in Not recoverable in
of the kind tort. MINN. STAT. tort. MINN. STAT.
§§ 604.10(a),(c). § 604.10(a).
Other Merchants Not recoverable in Recoverable in tort.
tort. MINN. STAT. MINN. STAT.
§§ 604.10(b),(c). § 604.10(a).
Consumers Not recoverable in Recoverable in tort.
tort. MINN. STAT. MINN. STAT.
§ 604.10(c). § 604.10(a).
The economic loss statute restores the "other property" exception,
121. See MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
122. See id.
123. See id. Entries in accompanying text Tables 1-3, referring to "tort," in-
clude only the torts of negligence and strict liability. See also Lloyd F. Smith Co. v.
Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 17 n.7 (Minn. 1992). The reader is cautioned
that federal courts have interpreted the Minnesota economic loss statute accord-
ing to Table 2. See infra text accompanying note 176. In 1993, the Minnesota Leg-
islature further defined the "other property" exception by amending the eco-
nomic loss statute, to add paragraph (d) "[t]he economic loss recoverable in tort
under this section does not include economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of
goods arising from damage to the manufactured goods and caused by a compo-
nent of the goods." Act of May 5, 1993, ch. 91, § 1, 1993 Minn. Laws 274 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.10(d) (1992 & Supp. 1993)). This is consistent
with the Fine Arts decision, which refused to consider a finished product as "other
property." See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Moreover, because such
a manufacturer would likely be considered a merchant in goods of the kind, other
sections of the statute would already bar recovery. See MINN. STAT. §§ 604.10(a),
(c) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
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which was eliminated in Hapka, for consumers and merchants, but not for
merchants in goods of the kind. 2 4 The economic loss statute also clearly
applies even to consumer plaintiffs. 125 Moreover, in addition to overrulingI-a"126
Hapka, the 1991 statute raises the question of whether Holstad survives.
Unlike Holstad, the economic loss statute does not look beyond "other
property" to further require that "the defect or damage is other than that
which could ordinarily be contemplated by the parties to a commercial
transaction."
27
I. Hard Facts in an Asbestos Case: 80 South Eighth
In 1992, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided 80 South Eighth StreetS128
Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc. without applying the economic loss
statute, because the case was already pending when the economic loss
statute was enacted. 12 In 80 South Eighth, the plaintiffs building con-
124. See MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
125. See id. § 604.10(c).
126. But see Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 13-15. Although Justice Simonett diplo-
matically concludes that Hapka survives enactment of Minnesota's economic loss
statute, he does so only by completely redefining its holding to apply U.C.C. exclu-
sivity only to merchants in goods of the kind. See id. No such limitation appears
anywhere in the Hapka decision itself. See generally Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 683.
127. Holstad, 421 N.W.2d at 375. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07. If
Holstad does not survive enactment of the economic loss statute, then the mer-
chant farmer in Holstad could recover in tort for damage caused by the defective
silo to other property (i.e., the stored feed), because the farmer would likely not
be considered a merchant in goods of the kind for the defective silo. See supra Ta-
ble 1 in text accompanying note 123. If, however, Holstad does survive the enact-
ment of economic loss statute, then Holstad would further require that the damage
be outside the contemplation of the parties, which resulted in no tort recovery for
the farmer in Holstad. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07. There is some
indication that Holstad did survive enactment of the economic loss statute. See Re-
gents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Chief Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 1409, 1412 (8th Cir.
1997). Chief Industries interprets merchants in goods of the kind to include more
than dealers of stock in trade, that is, to include any purchaser that has specialized
knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods in question. Id. at 1412. This would in-
clude the farmer in Holstad, who would have specialized knowledge about silos.
The specialized knowledge test seems merely another way of ascertaining what was
within the buyer's ordinary contemplation.
128. 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992), amended, 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992).
In 80 South Eighth, the United States District Court, District of Minnesota, certified
three questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court. See 486 N.W.2d at 394. But the
court only decided the question of whether the economic loss doctrine of Super-
wood and Hapka bars the owners of a building containing asbestos fireproofing
from suing the manufacturer under negligence and strict liability for the costs of
maintenance, removal, and replacement of the fireproofing. See id. at 394, 399.
129. See id. (finding no occasion to answer the question of retroactive applica-
tion of chapter 352 of the 1991 Minnesota Session laws).
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tained asbestos fireproofing, which damaged "other property" (i.e., the
building) only by creating a health hazard to the building's occupants.130
Notably, the asbestos fireproofing did not fail to perform its fireproofing
function.
131
In allowing the tort action against the fireproofing's manufacturer,
l
13
the 80 South Eighth court used the "personal injury" exception rather than
the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine. 133  Al-
though the court could justify allowing tort recovery here under the
"other property" exception by distinguishing the case from Fine Arts,M it
130. See id. at 394-95. The plaintiff sought no damages for personal injuries.
See id. at 395.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 399.
133. See id. at 397. The court stated:
We simply do not believe that 80 South Eighth's claim of asbestos con-
tamination is one for economic loss. 80 South Eighth is not seeking en-
forcement of the benefit of their bargain regarding the fireproofing per-
formance of the Monokote [fireproofing]. In seeking the costs of
maintenance, removal and replacement, 80 South Eighth seeks the costs
of eliminating the risks of injury and of making the building safe for all
those who use and occupy this property.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). While this emphasizes the risk of personal in-
jury over damage to other property, the last sentence makes it clear that, on these
facts, these two considerations are inseparable. See id.
134. See id. On this point, the court stated:
Here, however, there is a distinguishing factor. The claim here is not
that the fireproofing failed to perform satisfactorily as fireproofing. Such
a claim arising from the failure of the product to meet expectations of
suitability, quality and performance resulting in damages which a party to
a sales contract could reasonably expect would flow from a defect in the
product is a benefit of the bargain claim better addressed under contract
and the Uniform Commercial Code. Rather, the claim here is that the
Monokote [fireproofing] introduced into the building asbestos which is
highly dangerous to humans.
Id. 80 South Eighth can be understood as an expansion of the "personal injury" ex-
ception of the economic loss doctrine to include risk of personal injury. See supra
note 133. Alternatively, 80 South Eighth represents an exception to Fine Arts, allow-
ing tort recovery for damage to "other property" where the good itself is unrea-
sonably dangerous to humans in a way that is different from its failure to perform
its intended function. See 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 397. Such a view pres-
ently makes sense because the Minnesota Legislature has at least partially restored
the "other property" exception by overruling Hapka. However, 80 South Eighth did
not rely on retroactive application of the economic loss statute. See id. at 399.
Other language in 80 South Eighth indicates a return to the Holstad approach of
determining whether the damages were within the contemplation of the parties.
1520 [Vol. 25
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/13
AKA DISTRIBUTING CO. V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.
could not escape Hapka's repudiation of the "other property" exception
for commercial transactions. Consequently, 80 South Eighth expanded
the economic loss doctrine's "personal injury" exception to also include
risk of personal injury, 136 even though such risk of personal injury is, in
some respects, virtually indistinguishable from damage to other prop-
137
erty.
J. ClarifyingHapka: Den-Tal-Ez
The Minnesota Supreme Court also decided another pending case,
Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.," in 1992. Den-Tal-Ez did not rely on
the newly-enacted economic loss statute,'39 but it reached a consistent re-
sult.140 In Den-Tal-Ez, one of the plaintiffs purchased a dental business to-
gether with a second-hand motorized dental chair. The chair allegedly
caused a fire that destroyed the dentist's other property, and substantial
damage to the property of other tenants and the 
building.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that tort claims were pre-
See id. at 397 (analyzing whether the damages could reasonably have been ex-
pected to flow from a defect in the product, and whether the risk is of a type nor-
mally allocated between the parties to a contract by an agreement); see also supra
text accompanying note 107. Such inquiries are risky and unprincipled because
damages flowing from a defect are often (even usually) outside the contemplation
of the parties to a contractual agreement. Instead, 80 South Eighth is better viewed
as an expansion to the "personal injury" exception for risk of personal injury, or
better still, as an expansion to the "other property" exception for a good that per-
forms its intended function, but renders other property unreasonably dangerous
to humans. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABIUTY § 21 cmt. e,
reporters' note (1998). By limiting expansion of the exception to instances where
the good did not fail its intended function, 80 South Eighth does not create a wide
open exception for any defective good that poses an unreasonable risk of death or
personal injury. Cf. D'Angelo, supra note 43, at 601-08 (noting that the difficult
asbestos abatement cases are typically resolved using a harm to other property ra-
tionale).
135. See 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 398.
136. See id.
137. See supra notes 133-34.
138. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
139. See id. at 17 n.7.
140. See supra Table 1 in text accompanying note 123. Den-Tal-Ez has, however,
been interpreted instead according to Table 2, in the text accompanying note 176.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILtrY, § 21 cmt d., reporters'
note (1998). Such an interpretation, however, ignores Justice Simonett's directive
that "the U.C.C. provides the exclusive remedy for other property damages arising
out of a sale of goods only when ... the parties to the sale are dealers in the same
goods or, to use a more precise term, 'merchants in goods of the kind.'" Den-Tal-
Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 17 (footnote omitted).
141. SeeDen-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 12-13.
142. See id.
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cluded by the economic loss doctrine because Hapka foreclosed the "other
property" exception. 14 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,' 44 find-
ing that Hapka only foreclosed the "other property" exception for mer-
chants engaged in the buying and selling of their stock in trade.145 In
other words, merchants in goods of the kind can only recover under the
contract, even for damage to property other than the defective good it-
self.146 Parties other than merchants in goods of the kind, however, may
recover in tort for damage to property other than the defective good it-
self. 14 Although the dentist who purchased the defective chair was a mer-
chant, dental chairs were not his stock in trade. 14 As such, he was not a
merchant in goods of the kind, and could recover in tort.149
The other plaintiffs, including the building owner and other tenants,
"never had anything to do with the chair."15 ° For such third party plain-
tiffs, Den-Tal-Ez found no good reason not to allow tort claims, because do-
ing so did not jeopardize the integrity of the commercial code. '5 Moreo-
ver, the Uniform Commercial Code itself recognizes that "the rights and
duties of a third party may not be adversely varied by an agreement to
which he is not a party or by which he is not otherwise bound."
5 2
K "Merchants" vs. "Merchants in Goods of the Kind" Chief Industries
and Jennie-O
The Den-Tal-Ez decision provided a "principled basis" for applying
the economic loss doctrine,5 albeit narrowly, such that only merchants in
goods of the kind were limited to contractual remedies for damage to
"other property.", 5 4 Den-Tal-Ez and the plain language of the Minnesota
143. See Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 510, 513-14 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992).
144. See Den-TTal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 12.
145. See id. at 17.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 14.
151. See id. at 15-16. But see 2 SHAPO, supra note 21, 1 27.04[1] [b] (raising the
inevitable question of how to afford a remote seller the ability to limit its liability).
152. Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 16 n.6 (citing U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(b)). This sec-
tion of the U.C.C. has since been deleted because it was thought unnecessary. See
id.; see alsoJAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-
10, at 170 (3d ed. 1988) (noting that the U.C.C. third party protections are non-
variable).
153. See Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 14.
154. See id. at 17 (holding "that the U.C.C. provides the exclusive remedy for
other property damages arising out of a sale of goods only when that sale fits
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economic loss statute yielded identical results. 55 After Den-Tal-Ez, the
Minnesota Supreme Court decided no further economic loss cases."6
Other courts, however, adopted very different interpretations of Den-Tal-
E.
157
In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chief Industries, Inc.,158 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stretched the Den-Tal-Ez decision, al-
though Judge Lay offered a well-reasoned dissent. Chief Industries denied
tort claims to the University of Minnesota for a grain dryer heater with
an allegedly defective solenoid that caused a fire damaging an attached
grain dryinE structure at an agricultural research station operated by the
U niversity.1 
6 6161 162
Although Minnesota's economic loss statute, Den-Tal-Ez, and the
U.C.C. each explicitly distinguished between "merchants" and "mer-
chants in goods of the kind," the Chief Industries court merged these two164
categories for precluding tort recovery. It correctly read the U.C.C.
definition of "merchant" to include: (1) dealers in those goods (i.e.,
Hapka's narrow definition of a 'commercial transaction,' i.e., where the parties to a
sale are dealers in the same goods or, to use a more precise term, 'merchants in
goods of the kind.'").
155. Compare Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 17 (holding that only merchants in
goods of the kind are barred under the U.C.C. from tort recovery) with supra Ta-
ble 1 in text accompanying note 123 (same result).
156. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Chief Industries, Inc., 106 F.3d 1409,
1411 (8th Cir. 1997).
157. Compare Chief Indus., 106 F.3d at 1411-12 (holding that the University was
a merchant and thus barred under the U.C.C. from tort recovery) withJennie-O
Foods, Inc. v. Safe-Glo Prods. Corp., 582 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that "Jennie-O was entitled to recover in tort [for fire losses] because it
was not a 'merchant in goods of the kind'") and Dietz Bros., Inc. v. Klein Tools,
Inc., No. C9-92-1136, 1993 WL 19709, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1993) (affirm-
ing trial court's judgment "because the buyer is not a merchant and general prin-
ciples of Minnesota tort law permit it to assert non-code claims"). The differences
are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 183-89.
158. 106 F.3d 1409 (8th Cir. 1997).
159. See id. at 1412.
160. See id. at 1410.
161. See supra Table 1 in text accompanying notes 120-23.
162. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
163. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-104(1) (1998) (defining a "merchant" as "a per-
son who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ-
ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill"). The U.C.C. comment indicates
that those few U.C.C. provisions that apply only to merchants of goods of the kind
are identified by their specific use of that term. See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (1990).
164. See ChiefIndustries, 106 F.3d at 1411-12.
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"merchants in goods of the kind"'l), and (2) those with specialized
knowledge of the goods (i.e., other merchants). 16 Contrary to the plain
language of the economic loss statute and Den-Tal-Ez, however, the Chief
Industries court unwittingly precluded tort recovery arising from damage
to "other property" for all merchants, rather than for only merchants in167
goods of the kind. The Chief Industries court interpreted the economic
loss statute to reach the same result as Hapka, even though the Minnesota
Legislature enacted the economic loss statute to overrule Hapka.6s
The Chief Industries court found that the University had acquired spe-
cialized knowledge about the grain dryers by: (1) purchasing a number of
such units over the prior 30 years; (2) having a centralized purchasing de-
partment that solicited bids for the purchase; and (3) consulting an engi-169
neering expert for providing specifications. The court found that this
knowledge informed the University of the product's risks. 17° Chief Indus-
tries does not adequately explain, however, how having specialized knowl-
edge of the risk posed by an isolated purchase translates into a commer-
cial transaction in which the buyer can engage in meaningful negotiated
risk allocation. By distinguishing between merchants and merchants in
goods of the kind, the Den-Tal-Ez decision better supports the policy of the
economic loss doctrine.
The U.C.C. definition of "merchant" indicates that the Chief Industries
court failed to leave any merchants who could still recover in 
tort.171
Dealers and those with specialized knowledge' 72 make up the entire popu-
lation of U.C.C. merchants. 17 A party without specialized knowledge is,174
by definition, not a merchant, but is instead a consumer. Thus, con-
165. SeeDen-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 17.
166. See Chief Industries, 106 F.3d at 1411.
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying discussion. An argument exists,
however, that the plain language of section 604.10(a) referring to "merchants in
goods of the kind" should be ignored and read as "merchants," because the eco-
nomic loss statute intended to codify the pre-Hapka economic loss doctrine, which
did not distinguish between merchants and merchants in goods of the kind. See
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745-46 (D.
Minn. 1999), argued, No. 99-1424 (8th Cir. Nov. 15,1999).
168. See supra note 167 and accompanying text; see also AKA Distrib. Co. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1086 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998).
169. See Chief Industries, 106 F.3d at 1412.
170. See id.
171. See supra note 163.
172. According to the U.C.C. and, as used herein, "specialized knowledge" re-
fers to both personal knowledge as well as an agent's specialized knowledge. See
supra note 163.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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trary to the plain language of Minnesota Statutes section 604.10(a), 75
Chief Industries prohibited any merchant from seeking tort recovery, as il-
lustrated in Table 2.176
TABLE 2: Operation of the Economic Loss Statute as interpreted in
Chief Industries 
177
Claimant Goods themselves Other tangible
defective property damaged
Merchants in goods Not Recoverable in Not Recoverable in
of the kind tort. MINN. STAT. tort. MINN. STAT.
§§ 604.10(a),(c). § 604.10(a).
Other Merchants Not Recoverable in Not Recoverable in
tort. MINN. STAT. tort. Chief Industries.
§§ 604.10(b),(c).
Consumers Not Recoverable in Recoverable in tort.
tort. MINN. STAT. MINN. STAT.
§ 604.10(c). § 604.10(a).
Another, more charitable, view of the Chief Industries decision exists.
The "specialized knowledge" test of Chief Industries'78 could be replaced by
the more specific "within the ordinary contemplation of the parties" test
of Holstad, if Holstad survived enactment of Minnesota's economic loss
statute.18 Because the Chief Industries court used "specialized knowl-
edge"18' to indicate whether the University knew "of the risks posed by the
product and the potential damage to both the product and other property
that could result from product failure," 1 2 the Chief Industries court likely
simply tried to incorporate the fact-intensive Holstad inquiry into the
framework of the economic loss statute. Table 3 illustrates this possible
interpretation of the economic loss doctrine.
175. See supra Table 1 in text accompanying notes 120-23.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
177. See ChiefIndustries, 106 F.3d at 1410-12.
178. See id. at 1412.
179. See supra text accompanying note 105.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
181. See Chief Industries, 106 F.3d at 1412.
182. Id.
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TABLE 3: Operation of the Economic Loss Statute Incorporating
Holstad.
Claimant Goods themselves Other tangible
defective property damaged
Merchants in goods of Not Recoverable in Not Recoverable in
the kind tort. MINN. STAT. tort. MINN. STAT.
§§ 604.10(a),(c). § 604.10(a).
Other Within Not Recoverable in Not Recoverable in
Merchants Ordinary tort. MINN. STAT. tort. MINN. STAT.
Contem- §§ 604.10(b),(c). § 604.10(a) & Holstad.
plation
Outside Not Recoverable in Recoverable in tort.
Ordinary tort. MINN. STAT. MINN. STAT.
Contem- §§ 604.10(b),(c). § 604.10(a) & Holstad.
plation
Consumers Not Recoverable in Recoverable in tort.
tort. MINN. STAT. MINN. STAT.
§ 604.10(c). § 604.10(a).
While the economic loss doctrine frameworks illustrated in Tables 2
and 3 are interesting to consider, the plain language of the economic loss
statute does not support them. 18 In Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. Safe-Glo ProductsCop184
Corp., the Minnesota Court of Appeals found persuasive Judge Lay's
well-reasoned dissent in Chief Industries.185 Jennie-O was allowed to recover
in tort for defective heaters that caused fires destroying two turkey. 186
brooder barns. Although Jennie-O was a merchant, it was not a mer-
chant in goods of the kind with respect to heaters. 87 The Jennie-O court
gave effect to the legislature's choice of the term "merchants in goods of
the kind," as manifesting its intent to narrow application of the economic
183. See supra Table 1 accompanying note 123.
184. 582 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
185. See id. at 579.
186. See id. at 577-79, 81.
187. See id. at 579, 581.
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loss doctrine. s18  Together with Den-Tal-Ez and the plain language of the
economic loss statute, Jennie-O made Chief Industries suspect as being un-
supported by Minnesota statutes and existing case 
law.'89
III. FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND THE ECONOMIC Loss
DOCTRINE
A. What Constituted "Tort" Claims DuringDevelopment of Minnesota's
Economic Loss Doctrine
The economic loss doctrine emerged in response to strict liability.'90. . 191
Soon, however, it also precluded negligence claims. Minnesota's first
economic loss doctrine case, Superwood, expressly limited application of
the economic loss doctrine to the torts of negligence and strict liability,S , 193 194 . 15196
as did Fine Arts, S.J. Groves, 80 South Eighth, and Den-Tal-Ez, despite
some discussion in these cases about tort claims generally.
Some of the early economic loss doctrine cases actually included. . 197
fraud or misrepresentation claims. For example, Holstad allowed a
188. See id. at 579.
189. See id. The Chief Industries decision will continue to confound application
of the economic loss doctrine in federal courts until the Minnesota Supreme
Court clarifies whether the fact-intensive Holstad test for damage within the ordi-
nary contemplation of the parties' survives enactment of the Minnesota economic
loss statute. See, e.g., Minnesota Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 17 F. Supp.
2d 892, 905-08 (D. Minn. 1998) (applying Chief Industries, but finding a factual
question regarding whether the buyer had acquired enough specialized knowl-
edge to be considered a merchant).
190. See supra note 3.
191. See supra note 4.
192. SeeSuperwood v. Siempelkamp, 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981).
193. See Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc.,
354 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Minn. 1984); see also Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay
Bros. Co., 398 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Minn. 1987) (addressing negligence claim);
McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1987)
(addressing negligence claim).
194. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d
431, 435 (Minn. 1985) (answering in the negative the certified question of
whether a plaintiff could recover economic losses under negligence or strict liabil-
ity, but referring broadly to tort claims generally).
195. See 80 South Eighth Street Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486
N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1992).
196. See Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Minn.
1992).
197. See, e.g., Thofson v. Redex Indus., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Minn. CL
App. 1989). Thofson barred negligence and strict liability claims under the eco-
nomic loss doctrine because the damage to "other property" was minimal relative
to the damages alleged. See id. The Thofson court separately considered a negli-
27
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claim of fraudulent concealment during performance of the contract
based on an assertion that the defendant knew that plaintiffs silo air bag
was torn, but concealed this fact from the plaintiff. Similarly, Hapka's
broad language about the economic loss doctrine precluding tort claims
must be understood in light of its narrow definition of tort claims as being
limited to negligence and strict product liability." In fact, Hapka allowed
a misrepresentation claim to survive the economic loss doctrine.2 ' 1
B. Early Cases Focusing on the Effect of the Economic Loss Doctrine on
Fraud and Misrepresentation
A 1982 federal court decision, Northern States Power Co. v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,20 2 dealt squarely with the question of whether
the economic loss doctrine operated to preclude all tort claims, including
fraud and misrepresentation, or instead operated only to bar negligence
203
and strict liability claims. In N.S.P., the plaintiff purchased screw an-
chors for holding its power line towers in place using guy wires. 0 4 Defects
in the anchors resulted in several fallen towers. The plaintiffs claims
included breach of warranty, breach of contract, misrepresentation, strict206
liability, negligence, and fraudulent inducement to contract. The eco-
nomic loss doctrine limited recovery on the negligence and strict liability
207
claims to the damage to "other property," i.e., the towers. The N.S.P.
gent misrepresentation claim that the seller failed to fully disclose hazards associ-
ated with a grain dryer. See id. The negligent misrepresentation claim failed not
under the economic loss doctrine of Superwood, but rather, because the plaintiff
failed to support its allegation with sufficient specific facts. See id. at 905.
198. See Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 371, 374-75
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing the claim of fraudulent concealment, but finding
insufficient facts to support it).
199. See Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1990)
("(Mlaking tort theories of recovery available in commercial transactions flies in
the face of the court's recognition of the intended purview of the U.C.C.").
200. See id. at 686 (defining the tort theories of liability under review as negli-
gence and strict products liability).
201. See Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 431 N.W.2d 907, 909-11 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989). The trial court allowed the issue of misrepresentation to be submitted to
the jury. See id. at 909. The jury did not find misrepresentation by the seller. See
id. at 910. The court of appeals found adequate evidence to support this verdict,
because a grower simply could not guarantee potatoes to be totally disease free.
See id. at 910-11.
202. 550 F. Supp. 108 (D. Minn. 1982).
203. See id. at 111-12.
204. See id. at 109.
205. See id. at I10.
206. See id. at 109.
207. See id. at 111. The damage to "other property," (i.e., the towers), how-
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court, however, refused to broadly construe dicta in Superwood to preclude
claims for misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement to contract.208 It
found that Superwood only limited the use of negligence and strict liability209
tort theories, such that "claims for fraudulent inducement to contract
and misrepresentation may be brought in addition to claims in contract
and warranty."
210
In 1992, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reached a contrary result in
an unpublished decision, ETM Graphics, Inc. v. City of St. Paul.2 1 In ETM,
the plaintiff purchased adhesive that it used to install canvas murals.212 A
213
defect in the adhesive caused bubbles to form behind the murals. The
plaintiffs claims included fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract,
214
breach of implied and express warranties, and negligence. The ETM
court relied on broad language in Hapka that "the Uniform Commercial
Code must control exclusively with respect to damages in a commercial
transaction which involves property damages only,"2 1 to strike the plain-
tiff's misrepresentation claim. The ETM court also noted Hapka's
statement that "[t]he Code [U.C.C.] itself indicates that the U.C.C. is in-
tended to displace tort liability."2 17 Although several other decisions fol-2183
lowed ETM, the ETM court likely could have decided that case on nar-
ever, was a small fraction of the total damages sought. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 111-12.
210. Id. at 112 ("Misrepresentation is a distinct tort, however, and Superwood
did not address whether this right of action should be discontinued in commercial
settings.").
211. No. C2-91-2103, 1992 WL 61394 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31,1992).
212. See id. at *1.
213. See id.
214. See id. The plaintiff asserted fraud and misrepresentation claims in an at-
tempt to avoid disclaimers on the adhesive containers that limited seller's liability
to replacing or reimbursing any material found defective. See id. at *2, *4.
215. Id. at *2 (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn.
1990)).
216. See id.
217. Id. ETM relies heavily on Hapka; however, Hapka was considering only the
tort theories of negligence and strict liability, and purports only that the U.C.C.
displaces negligence and strict liability. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688; see also supra
notes 199-200 and accompanying text. It is erroneous to conclude that the U.C.C.
automatically preempts fraud and misrepresentation claims. See MINN. STAT. §
336.1-103 (1996) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall sup-
plement its provisions.") (emphasis added).
218. See Nelson Distrib., Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Indus. Balancers, 808 F. Supp.
684, 688 (D. Minn. 1992) (believing that the Minnesota Supreme Court would fol-
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rower grounds,"9 and ETMshould carry little weight today. First, a careful
reading of Hapka indicates that the Hapka court only considered the eco-
nomic loss doctrine to preclude the torts of negligence and strict liability,
not misrepresentation. Second, Den-Tal-Ez clearly reinterpreted and se-. 221
verely limited Hapka, and the Minnesota Legislature overruled Hapka by
222
enacting section 604.10 of the Minnesota Statutes.
C. A Hybrid Approach: AKA
Until recently, the opposite approaches of N.S.P. and ETM in apply-
ing the economic loss doctrine to fraud and misrepresentation claims
stood in sharp contrast to each other. In early 1998, however, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a hybrid approach in AKA Distributing
223
Co. v. Whirlpool Corp. In 1985, the plaintiff vacuum cleaner distributor,
AKA, had entered into a one year distribution agreement with Whirlpool,
the defendant manufacturer, to distribute a new line of branded vacuum
224cleaners. After the distribution agreement expired, the parties agreed
that the relationship would continue under the same terms without a writ-225
ten contract. In the presence of other distributors in 1986, Whirlpool
226
assured AKA that this was to be a long-term relationship. AKA made
many engineering suggestions to improve the Whirlpool products, which
had many problems, and, in one instance, AKA's suggestions prevented a
low the ETM extension of Hapka despite the fact that the court had severely cur-
tailed Hapka only two months earlier in Den-Tal-Ez); Upsher-Smith Lab., Inc. v. My-
lan Lab., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1411, 1435-36 (D. Minn. 1996) (concluding that the
broad reasoning of Hapka supports its decision); In re Grain Land Coop, 978 F.
Supp. 1267, 1279-80 (D. Minn. 1997) (recognizing that Hapka principles were
sharpened in Den-Tal-Ez).
219. See MINN. R. Crv. P. 9.02 ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the cir-
cumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").
Courts should use the heightened pleading requirements, where possible, to
eliminate unsubstantiated claims of fraud and misrepresentation. See, e.g., Thof-
son v. Redex Indus., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that summary judgment was proper on negligent misrepresentation claim where
plaintiffs relied on general allegations and did not present specific facts).
220. See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
223. 137 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals fol-
lowed the trial court decision, in which Judge David S. Doty established this hybrid
approach. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 948 F. Supp. 903, 907-08 (D.
Minn. 1996) (citing Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc.,
532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)).
224. SeeAKA, 137 F.3d at 1084.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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227
recall. In 1988, Whirlpool terminated the distribution agreement on
the same day that it announced a major purchase commitment from Sears
228
Roebuck and Company.
AKA did not sue until 1993, when it asserted claims including breach
of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and negli-229
gent misrepresentation. AKA alleged that Whirlpool fraudulently told
distributors they could sell Whirlpool products for a long time in an at-
tempt to conceal its secret plan of manufacturing private label vacuum, 230
cleaners for Sears. According to AKA, Whirlpool lured AKA into sign-
ing the distributorship contract to capture its engineering talents in de-. , 231
veloping a product line acceptable to Sears.
The AKA court applied the "predominant purpose" test of Valley
Farmers 32 and found the distribution agreement predominantly for the
sale of goods rather than for the ancillary provision of engineering serv-
ices by the plaintiff.233 As such, the four year U.C.C. statute of limitations
barred the breach of contract claims.2 4
The AKA court also considered whether the economic loss doctrine
235
bars fraud and misrepresentation torts. It recognized that in spite of
broad dicta in Superwood and its progeny regarding the viability of tort li-
ability in commercial transactions, no Minnesota Supreme Court case had
directly incorporated fraud and misrepresentation into the economic loss
236
doctrine. However, it noted that "the presence of a governing commer-
227. See id. at 1084-85.
228. See id. at 1085.
229. See AKA, 948 F. Supp. at 904.
230. See AKA, 137 F.3d at 1085.
231. See id.
232. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
233. See AKA, 137 F.3d at 1085.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1085-87.
236. See id. at 1086. However, the AKA court curiously suggested that post-
Superwood extension of the economic loss doctrine to all contracts governed by
U.C.C. Article 2 implies that the Minnesota Supreme Court would also extend the
economic loss doctrine to all other kinds of torts. See id. The mistake in this rea-
soning is readily apparent from the nature of the AKA case itself. Unlike the other
economic loss doctrine cases, which dealt with products liability in the context of a
commercial transaction, AKA does not even concern liability for a defective prod-
uct. The policy considerations for fraud and misrepresentation in the context of
AKA are likely to be quite different from policies underlying the economic loss
doctrine as applied to products liability. Moreover, fraud and misrepresentation
are distinguishable from negligence and strict liability. Fraud and misrepresenta-
tion may address the basis for contract formation, while negligence and strict li-
ability address contract performance. Thus, there may be good reason to treat
fraud and misrepresentation differently from negligence and strict liability under
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cial contract neither preempts nor eliminates" all fraud claims. 237 Under
traditional principles of contract and tort law, a "fraud claim independent
of the contract is actionable, but it must be based upon a misrepresenta-
tion that was outside of or collateral to the contract, such as many claims
of fraudulent inducement., 2  The AKA court applied this rule to the
economic loss doctrine, holding that "in a suit between merchants, a fraud
claim to recover economic losses must be independent of the [U.C.C.] Ar-
ticle 2 contract or it is precluded by the economic loss doctrine." 2
9
The court found AKA's fraud claim-that Whirlpool lied about a
long term relationship-indistinguishable from its breach of contract
claim; both claims were premised on an alleged failure by Whirlpool to
perform for the duration of the alleged contract.240 For this claim, the1- 241
court limited AKA to its U.C.C. remedies. But the court found AKA's
constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims-that Whirl-
pool failed to disclose its plan to move its distribution to Sears--consti-
tuted a "collateral subject that [could] support an independent fraud-in-
the-inducement claim."2 4 2 However, because AKA and Whirlpool had an
arms-length relationship, Whirlpool had no duty to disclose its plans to
AKA. 24 In such a situation, the court required an affirmative misrepre-S 244
sentation for the tort claim to be actionable. In summary, the economic
loss doctrine did not bar AKA's "independent" fraud and misrepresenta-
tion tort claims, but AKA failed to establish all the required elements of
such claims.245
the economic loss doctrine.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1087. By implication, AKA would allow a fraud claim by a consumer
even if not independent of the contract for sale of goods. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
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D. Marvin Windows Evokes a Swift Legislative Response
In 1998, Marvin Windows, which has significant operations in War-
246
road, Minnesota, made an urgent request to the Minnesota Legislature.
Marvin was embroiled in litigation with Pennsylvania-based PPG Industries
based on Marvin's allegation that PPG supplied defective wood preserva-
tive that caused Marvin's windows to rot prematurely. 247 The court ini-
tially dismissed Marvin's common law tort claims, which included negli-
gence, strict liability, fraud, and misrepresentation, as barred by the
economic loss doctrine to the extent they sought damages beyond damage
to "other property."248 In response, then Minnesota Governor Arne Carl-249
son called the Minnesota Legislature into special session, and the legis-250
lature amended Minnesota's economic loss statute to allow fraud and
misrepresentation claims to the extent allowed under the common 
law.25 1
As amended, Minnesota Statutes section 604.10 provides:
Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 1996, section 604.10, is amended
to read:
604.10 ECONOMIC LOSS ARISING FROM THE SALE OF
GOODS
246. See Marvin Windows President Pushes For Special Session, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Apr. 15, 1998, at Dl. Marvin's lawsuit and the special session generated
significant publicity in Minnesota. See, e.g., Robert Whereatt, Bill Would Clarify Law
In Suit Involving Marvin Windows, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 9, 1998,
at 3D; Susan E. Peterson & Tony Kennedy, Marvin Windows' Predicament: Standing
Behind Its Product Could Bring About Its Demise, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Apr. 18, 1998, at IA; Susan Marvin, To Close a Loophole That Lets In Fraud, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 20, 1998, at 13A; Larry Oakes, Marvin Windows Is
the Lifeblood of a Small Town, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 20, 1998, at
IA; Dane Smith et al., Senate OKs Help For Marvin, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), Apr. 21, 1998, at IA; Robert Whereatt & Conrad deFiebre, House Passes
Marvin Windows, Spending Bills, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 23, 1998, at
IA.
247. See Robert Whereatt, Special Session Possible To Aid Warroad Company, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 14, 1998, at lB.
248. See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738,
741 (D. Minn. 1999), argued, No. 99-1424 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999); see also Bye &
Peck, supra note 1, at 41, 44, 45 n.23.
249. See Robert Whereatt & Donna Halvorsen, It's Back to the Capitol for Spend-
ing, Fraud Bills, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 17, 1998, at IA.
250. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2, 1998 Minn. Laws 2322
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.10).
251. See id. § 1 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.10(e)). The legislature approved
the amendment on April 22, 1998 to have effect the following day, and to apply to
actions pending or commenced after that date. See id. § 4.
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(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods that is due to
damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may be
recovered in tort as well as in contract, but economic loss that
arises from a sale of goods between parties who are each mer-
chants in goods of the kind is not recoverable in tort.
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods, between
merchants, that is not due to damage to tangible property other
than the goods sold may not be recovered in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section
does not include the economic loss due to damage to the goods
themselves.
(d) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section
does not include economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of
goods arising from damage to the manufactured goods and
caused by a component of the goods.
(e) This section shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of ac-
tion based upon fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepre-
sentation or limit remedies for those actions.
Sec. 2. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The amendment in section 1 is
intended to clarify, rather than to change, the original intent of
Minnesota Statutes, section 604.10.
Sec. 3. REVISOR'S INSTRUCTION. In the next and subse-
quent editions of Minnesota Statutes, the revisor shall insert an
annotation to Minnesota Statutes, section 336.2-721, alerting
the reader to Minnesota Statutes, section 604.10, and the inter-
relationship of the two sections.
Sec. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. This act is effective the day follow-
ing final enactment and applies to actions pending on or com-
menced on or after that date.252
252. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2, 1998 Minn. Laws 2322
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.10) (the 1998 amendments are under-
lined). In Minnesota, the elements of fraud are:
[A] false representation pertaining to a material past or present fact sus-
ceptible of human knowledge, knowledge by the person making the rep-
resentation of its falsity or assertion of it without knowledge of its truth or
falsity, an intention that the other person act on it, or circumstances justi-
fying the other person in so acting, and the other person being in fact
reasonably induced to act upon the representation, relying upon it and
suffering damage attributable to the misrepresentation.
In re Strid, 487 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. 1992).
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The Minnesota Legislature failed in its parochial effort to assist
Marvin Windows because the Marvin court found that these amendments
applied only to transactions governed by section 604.10 of the Minnesota
Statutes.253 Because the transactions between Marvin Windows and PPG
occurred before enactment of the statute, those transactions were gov-
erned by the previously existing common law economic loss doctrine of
Minnesota, and not by the economic loss statute or its most recent
amendments.6 0
Marvin also recognized the split between the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Chief Industries and the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Jennie-O
over whether the other property exception to the economic loss doctrine
is foreclosed for all merchants, or merely for merchants in goods of the
kind.255 The Marvin court sided with Chief Industries, in dicta, finding the
256
other property exception foreclosed for all merchants. However,
Marvin Windows was clearly a merchant in goods of the kind because of its
long history of purchasing window treatments, its membership in a trade
association, and its equality of bargaining power with PPG.257 Thus, the
ChiefIndustries-Jennie-O split played no role in the outcome of this case.
The Marvin court applied the AKA test and found that Marvin's
fraud and misrepresentation claims were not independent of the underly-
258
ing contract. Marvin argued that its fraud and misrepresentation claims
were outside the scope of the contract because PPG's statements regard-
ing its own good will and trustworthiness were of a more global nature.259
The Marvin court disagreed, noting U.C.C. provisions that create express
warranties of the Seller's promises, descriptions, or affirmations of fact re-
260
lating to the good and becoming part of the basis of the bargain. The
Marvin court summarily declared that because each of PPG's statements
involved matters "closely tied" to the wood preservative sales contracts,
these statements created express warranties that became part of the con-261
tract, such that the economic loss doctrine barred tort recovery. The
Marvin court failed to adequately explain exactly how PPG's statements
related to the goods rather than to ancillary matters of a more global na-
253. See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738,
743-44 (D. Minn. 1999), argued, No. 99-1424 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
254. See id.
255. See id. at 747-48.
256. See id. at 748.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 749.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
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ture that might have constituted fraudulent inducement to contract or
262
other claims that were independent of the underlying contract.
Though ineffectual for Marvin's dispute, the recent amendments are
a potentially significant change to Minnesota's economic loss statute. By
its terms, subsection (e) applies regardless of whether the plaintiff is a
merchant in goods of the kind, a merchant, or a consumer, or whether
the plaintiff asserts damage to the good itself or to other property.263
Moreover, even though subsection (e) allows tort causes of action based
upon fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation, the tort theory
264of negligent misrepresentation is conspicuously absent, unless the term265
fraud is understood to include negligent misrepresentation. Thus, it is
unclear whether the newly amended economic loss statute precludes
claims of negligent misrepresentation.266
262. See id.
263. See MINN. STAT. § 604.10(e) (1998).
264. See id. In Minnesota, actionable misrepresentation includes both inten-
tional and negligent misrepresentation. See Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168,
173 (Minn. 1986). Intentional misrepresentations are: (1) known to be false, or
(2) asserted as being of the representer's own knowledge when he or she does not
in fact know whether the representation is true or false. See id. (noting that Min-
nesota law of fraudulent misrepresentation parallels RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 526 (1977)). The second prong of intentional misrepresentation, stated
above, is sometimes referred to as reckless misrepresentation. See id. at 177 & n.2
(Simonett, J. concurring specially). Negligent misrepresentation occurs when the
misrepresenter has not discovered or communicated certain information that the
ordinary person in his or her position using reasonable care would have discov-
ered or communicated. See id. at 174. In Minnesota, negligent misrepresentation
is actionable only when the misrepresenter is "supplying information, either for:
(1) the guidance of others in the course of a transaction in which one has a pecu-
niary interest; or (2) in the course of one's business, profession, or employment."
Id. (citing Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 122, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99 (1976),
which adopted the definition of negligent misrepresentation in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12 1966)). The Florenzano court also
held that comparative fault principles apply to negligent misrepresentation, in-
creasing the difficulty of recovering for such claims even if they are not precluded
by the economic loss doctrine. See id. at 176.
265. See Juster Steel v. Carlson Cos., 366 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (noting that "Minnesota courts have recognized that negligent misrepresen-
tation constitutes fraud").
266. See id.; see also Northern States Power Co. v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108, 112 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting that "it is arguable that re-
covery for merely negligent misrepresentation should not be allowed since Super-
wood disallowed negligence actions for economic loss in commercial transac-
tions"). Intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement to contract
present clear cases for recovering economic losses in tort. See 2 SHAPO, supra note
21, 1 27.04[8]. The economic loss doctrine should preclude negligent misrepre-
sentation claims that are indistinguishable from mere disappointed expectations,
and are not separate and independent from the contract. See id. 27.04[8a]
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267
ETM and its progeny, which barred all tort claims under the eco-
nomic loss doctrine, were apparently legislatively overruled by the enact-
ment of subsection (e), whereas the opposite approach taken in N.S.P.
268
appears to remain viable. But the language used in subsection (e) 269 ap-
pears to leave room for the hybrid approach of AKA, which required that
the fraud or misrepresentation claim be independent of the underlying
270contract for a sale of goods between merchants. Whether AKA survived
the enactment of subsection (e) remains an open question.
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT
THE AKA RULE
A. Judicial Guidance is Needed
Although arguably enacted as a knee-jerk response to a powerful
constituent, subsection (e) is not completely without basis. In the ab-
sence of carefully articulated guidance from the Minnesota Supreme
272Court, subsection (e) halted a disturbing trend toward foreclosing all
claims of fraud and misrepresentation in commercial transactions for the
sale of goods.273 This trend represented overextension by the economic
loss doctrine without sufficient analysis of its underlying policy basis.
274
Without AKA, however, the newly enacted subsection (e) stands as. an
(Supp. 1998) (citing Coleman Cable Sys., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 847 F. Supp. 93, 95
(N.D. Ill. 1994)). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9 &
cmt e. (1998) (allowing liability for negligent, and even innocent, misrepresenta-
tion, regardless of whether it is independent of the contract). See also Richard P.
Salgado, Negligent Misrepresentation and The Economic Loss Rule, 22 COLO. LAw. 1689,
1689-90 (describing additional requirements courts may impose to restrict recov-
ery for negligent misrepresentation).
267. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
269. See MINN. STAT. § 604.10(e) ("This section shall not be interpreted to
bar .... "). Such language appears to leave intact any common law doctrine that is
not wholly inconsistent with the statute itself. See id.
270. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
271. Cf Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 4-95-739, slip
op. at 66-69 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1998) (Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Erickson).
272. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir.
1998) ("[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed whether the eco-
nomic loss doctrine bars fraud and misrepresentation torts.").
273. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also Kee v. National Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying Florida law) (noting
that "the mere existence of a contract claim does not automatically vitiate all
causes of action in tort").
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open invitation for disappointed purchasers of defective oods to replead
their contract claims of economic losses to sound in tort, creating access
276
to a substantially extended limitations period. The "collateral tort" re-
quirement of AKA limits plaintiffs to proper fraud and misrepresentation
claims. 77 AKA also comports with established principles of contract and27827
tort law, the economic loss doctrine," and the legislative intent of sub-
section (e)y. Moreover, the AKA rule is part of a recognizable emerging
trend.
28 '
275. See Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So. 2d 74, 77-78 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Puff 'N Stuff of Winter Park, Inc. v. Bell, 683 So. 2d
1176, 1179-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Harris, J. concurring specially)). Almost
any contract claim can be framed as a fraud claim, and perhaps even as a fraud in
the inducement claim. See id. The AKA rule does not offer a bright line test; it re-
quires a careful examination of the substance of the claim. See id.
276. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The plaintiff will not, however,
gain access to punitive damages unless the tort is independent of the contract. See
Jacobs v. Farmland Mutual Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 441, 444-45 (Minn. 1985). Since
this is the same requirement as the AKA rule (for situations involving the sale of
goods), AKA leaves access to punitive damages unchanged. See supra note 239 and
accompanying text. In Minnesota, punitive damages may be unavailable in prod-
ucts liability cases unaccompanied by personal injury. Compare Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 622 v. Keene Corp., 511 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Minn. 1994) (requiring per-
sonal injury for punitive damages in a products liability action) with Molenaar v.
United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 427-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (construing
Keene as being limited to products liability cases, and distinguishing intentional
acts from products liability based on simple negligence and strict liability). See
also Tracy M. Borash, Torts-Punitive Damages in Non-Personal Injury Cases: Minne-
sota's Approach to Punishment and Deterrence, 24 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 213, 228-30
(1998) (analyzing the Molenaar case).
277. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
278. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1086 (Minn.
1998).
279. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 269.
281. See AKA, 137 F.3d at 1086-87 (finding fraudulent inducement actionable
in sale of goods, but unsubstantiated by any affirmative misrepresentation); Accord
Northern States Power Co. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108,
111-12 (D. Minn. 1982) (denying motion to dismiss fraudulent inducement claim
in sale of goods without examining its underlying basis), Huron Tool & Eng'g Co.
v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc. 532 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding fraudulent inducement actionable in sale of goods, but finding represen-
tations about quality of software indistinguishable from terms of contract and war-
ranty); Allmand Assocs., Inc. v. Hercules Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1216, 1227-28 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (finding fraudulent inducement actionable in sale of goods, but find-
ing representations about molding resin not extraneous to the contractual dis-
pute); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 831 (8th Cir.
1983) (denying motion to dismiss fraudulent inducement claim in sale of goods,
but expressing doubts about whether plaintiffs could prove facts of all elements).
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B. Policy Basis ofAKA
In Minnesota, the economic loss doctrine exists only to defend the2
U.C.C. against circumvention. However, the U.C.C. itself admits that
283
certain fraud and misrepresentation claims are outside its purview. As
always, the "critical problem [is] to find some principled basis for decid-
ing" when the U.C.C. remedies lie exclusively, and when fraud and mis-
representation also apply.2 15 The collateral tort requirement of AKA pro-
vides such a principled basis and is supported by the policies underlying
the economic loss doctrine, as discussed below.
The economic loss doctrine "encourages parties to negotiate eco-
nomic risks through warranty provisions and price" s6 thus "keeping the
risks of liability reasonably calculable."287 The economic loss doctrine
"does not apply where there is no contractual relationship between the
parties-that is, where the parties have never been in a position to negoti-
ate the economic risks themselves.,
2 8
Fraud and misrepresentation claims based on conduct prior to con-
282. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.
1981) (stating that "the legislature did not intend for tort law to circumvent the
statutory scheme of the U.C.C."); see also McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery,
Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Minn. 1987) (noting that "when the U.C.C. does not
apply, there is no reason for the Superwood rule to apply"). In other jurisdictions,
the economic loss doctrine is broader than the scope of the U.C.C. See, e.g., Ray-
theon Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 979 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (applying
Wisconsin law and concluding that federal courts in Wisconsin have not limited
the application of the economic loss doctrine to disputes arising out of the sale of
goods). One must be careful citing non-U.C.C. decisions in Minnesota; such cases
may not be persuasive. See In re Grain Land Coop, 978 F. Supp. 1267, 1280 (D.
Minn. 1997) (stating that cited cases not implicating the U.C.C. are "simply inap-
posite" to contract at issue, which was within the scope of the U.C.C.).
283. See supra note 217; see also MINN. STAT. § 336.2-721 (1996). "Remedies for
material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this arti-
cle for nonfraudulent breach. Neither rescission or a claim for rescission of the
contract for sale nor rejection or return of the goods shall bar or be deemed in-
consistent with a claim for damages or other remedy." Id. The purpose of this
statute is to correct the situation where the remedies for fraud (e.g., rescission) are
more circumscribed than the remedies for breach of warranty (e.g., money dam-
ages). See U.C.C. § 2-721 cmt. (1990).
284. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. 1992).
285. See id.
286. Huron Tool, 532 N.W.2d at 545 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. 1987)).
287. Id. (quoting Bay Garden Manor Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. James D.
Marks Assocs., Inc., 576 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991)).
288. Id. (citing Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 617
(Mich. 1992)).
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tract formation 2s9 may constitute fraud in the inducement, for which sev-
eral courts have carved an exception to the economic loss doctrine?"
Fraud in the inducement presents a special situation where par-
ties to a contract appear to negotiate freely-which normally
would constitute grounds for invoking the economic loss doc-
trine-but where in fact the ability of one party to negotiate fair
terms and make an informed decision is undermined by the
other party's fraudulent behavior.nl
Collateral fraud in the inducement is distinct from: (1) misrepresen-
tations concerning the quality or character of the goods sold, for which
the buyer is still free to negotiate warranty and other terms; and (2) mis-
representations concerning the breaching party's performance, which did
not induce the other party to enter into the contract and which are indis-
tinguishable from a breach of contract claim. Under the collateral tort
requirement of AKA, the economic loss doctrine precludes these latter
two types of claims, while leaving open a claim for collateral fraud in the
inducement. 9 3 Together with the heightened pleading requirements of
289. See, e.g., Allmand Assocs., Inc., v. Hercules Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1216, 1227
(E.D. Mich. 1997) ("The Michigan courts have carved out one exception to the
economic loss doctrine, to wit: fraud in the inducement."). Where a series of suc-
cessive contracts are involved, however, a court will have more difficulty applying
the AKA requirement of a collateral tort, such as fraud in the inducement. See
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738, 748 (D.
Minn. 1999), argued, No. 99-1424 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
290. See Allmand, 960 F. Supp. at 1227. Other intentional torts (e.g., defama-
tion, intentional misrepresentation, tortious interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage, and intentional interference with contractual relations) may
also fall outside the purview of the economic loss doctrine. See Huron Tool, 532
N.W.2d at 544 (citations omitted).
291. Huron Too4 532 N.W.2d at 545.
292. See id. This comports with established Minnesota law that an oral repre-
sentation or description of the goods creates an express warranty. See MINN. STAT.
§ 336.2-313 (1998). "It has long been the law in Minnesota that, once made, an
express warranty as to the quality or nature of a good becomes a part of the con-
tract for the sale of the good itself." See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG In-
dus., Inc., Civ. No. 4-95-739, slip op. at 85 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1998) (Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Erickson) (citing Heil v. Standard Chemical
Mfg. Co., 301 Minn. 315, 321-22, 223 N.W.2d 37, 40-41 (1974); McNaughton v.
Wahl, 99 Minn. 92, 96, 108 N.W. 467, 468 (1906); Schurmeier v. English, 46 Minn.
306, 307, 48 N.W. 1112, 1113 (1892), Thompson v. Libby, 36 Minn. 287, 289, 31
N.W. 52, 53 (1886)). Also, misrepresentations of present fact are more likely to be
actionable than misrepresentations of future intent. See OHM Remediation Servs.
Corp. v. Hughes Envtl. Sys., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (dealing
with services, not the sale of goods).
293. See supra notes 239 & 242 and accompanying text.
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294
fraud and misrepresentation, the AKA rule establishes a remarkably
high threshold which ensures that only proper fraud and misrepresenta-
tion claims survive.295
C. Unanswered Questions and Remaining Issues
AKA applied the collateral tort requirement in sales of goods be-
tween merchants, but should it be restricted to merchants in goods of the
kind or expanded to include consumers?2 6 Both subsection (e) and the
collateral tort requirement are presently limited to intentional torts; does
the economic loss doctrine still preclude claims of negligent misrepresen-
tation?297 If the AKA collateral tort requirement is adopted, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court will have to decide the effect of an integration clause,
by which all prior agreements are superseded by the written contract.298
Does an integration clause remove all possibility of a collateral claim of
intentional fraud or misrepresentation?--- The Minnesota Supreme Court
should also answer whether Chief Industries properly defined merchants in
goods of the kind in view of Den-Tal-Ez, and whether the Holstad test (i.e.,
whether the defect was within the ordinary contemplation of the parties),
still applies.wo The Minnesota Legislature may answer some of these ques-
tions by completely revising the Minnesota economic loss statute.30'
294. See FED. R. CIv. P. 9 (b); see also supra note 220.
295. See supra note 282.
296. See supra text accompanying note 239.
297. See supra note 290; see also supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
298. See OHM Remediation Servs. Corp. v. Hughes Envtl. Sys., Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 120, 123 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[I]f the fraud claim is based on an agreement
not integrated into the contract at issue, such as a collateral oral agreement, the
plaintiff may maintain a claim for fraud simultaneously with the breach of contract
claim.").
299. See id.
300. See supra notes 154-88 and accompanying text.
301. See S.F. 1126, 81st Legis. Sess. (Minn. 1999) (introduced on Feb. 25, 1999
by Sen. Betzvold); H.F. 1267, 81st Legis. Sess. (Minn. 1999) (introduced on Mar. 1,
1999 by Rep. Pawlenty). On March 24, 1999, H.F. 1267 passed out of the House
Civil Law Committee after amendment. See H.F. 1267, 1st Engrossment, 81st Le-
gis. Sess. (Minn. 1999). Senate File 1126 follows Chief Industries and Hapka in ap-
plying the economic loss doctrine to all merchants, even though the Minnesota
Legislature enacted the present economic loss statute specifically to overrule
Hapka. See S.F. 1126, subd. 2(a); see also supra text accompanying note 168. Al-
though any clarification of the Chief Industries-Jennie-O split is welcome, this ex-
traordinary reversal in the policy of the economic loss statute seems quite inexpli-
cable. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68, 171-76. Nonetheless, it solves the
problem of Chief Industries being inconsistent with the economic loss statute, but
does so by simply changing the economic loss statute. Senate File 1126 also adopts
AKA's collateral tort requirement, though it limits collateral torts to fraud in the
15411999]
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V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the
economic loss doctrine forecloses fraud and misrepresentation claims.
Now, the Minnesota Legislature has spoken, declaring that such claims are
not foreclosed, at least not by statute. Without guidance from the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, the economic loss statute creates the "danger of al-
lowing contract law to 'drown in a sea of tort' ... where the fraud and
"302
breach of contract claims are factually indistinguishable. Thus, the
inducement. See S.F. 1126, subd. 2(a)-(b). Senate File 1126 also removes existing
ambiguity by clearly precluding recovery for economic losses based on negligent
misrepresentation. See id. subd. 1 (c). However, Senate File 1126 departs from the
existing economic loss statute by also precluding recovery for economic losses
based on reckless misrepresentations, which Minnesota law presently considers
part of intentional misrepresentation. See id.; see also supra text accompanying
notes 263-64; Letter from Linda J. Rusch, Professor of Law, Hamline University
School of Law, and Daniel S. Kleinberger, Professor of Law, William Mitchell Col-
lege of Law, to Sen. Jane Ranum, Chair, Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee,
and Rep. Steve Smith, Chair, Minnesota House Civil Law Committee, at 3-4 (Feb.
24, 1999) (on file with author).
House File 1267 differs from Senate File 1126 in several respects. House
File 1267 allows recovery for economic losses based on reckless and intentional
misrepresentations, making it consistent with existing Minnesota law concerning
fraud and misrepresentation. See H.F. 1267, 1st Engrossment, subd. 1(c); see also
supra note 264. Unlike Senate File 1126, House File 1267 uses merchants in goods
of the kind, rather than merchants, as the touchstone for determining the extent
to which economic losses should be precluded. Compare H.F. 1267, 1st Engross-
ment, subd. 1(d) with S.F. 1126, subd. 1(d). Thus, House File 1267 is consistent
with the original purpose of the present economic loss statute in legislatively over-
ruling Hapka. See supra text accompanying note 168. Moreover, it equates mer-
chants in goods of the kind with "dealers," thereby correctly resolving the Chief In-
dustries-Jennie-O split in favor of Jennie-O and Den-Tal-Ez. Compare H.F. 1267, 1st
Engrossment, subd. 1(d) with S.F. 1126, subd. 1(d); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 161-68, 171-76. However, House File 1267 departs from the longstand-
ing principle that in Minnesota the economic loss doctrine exists only to protect
sales of goods under U.C.C. Article 2. See supra text accompanying note 75.
House File 1267 would extend the economic loss doctrine to preclude recovery for
noncollateral economic losses "in transactions outside the scope of article 2...
where the buyer is a merchant in goods of the kind." H.F. 1267, 1st Engrossment,
subd. 2(a). Thus, House File 1267 would eliminate the Valley Farmers' predomi-
nant factor test, but only where the buyer is a dealer in goods of the kind. See id.;
see also supra text accompanying note 82. For other buyers, the predominant fac-
tor test may still apply. While this proposed extension of the economic loss doc-
trine beyond U.C.C. Article 2 seems unlikely to arise in practice, it needlessly de-
stroys the long-existing bright line Superwood rule based on the clearly articulated
policy basis of protecting the U.C.C. See supra text accompanying note 75. The
Minnesota Legislature should either offer a clear policy justification for enlarging
application of the economic loss doctrine outside the U.C.C., or it should elimi-
nate this language from House File 1267.
302. Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d
1542 [Vol. 25
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AKA DISTRIBUTING CO. V. WHIRLPOOL CORP.
Minnesota Supreme Court should follow the AKA court in recognizing the
emerging trend of requiring any claim for fraud or intentional misrepre-
sentation to be independent of, or collateral to, an underlying contract
for the sale of goods between merchants.
541, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486
N.W.2d 612, 618 (Mich. 1992)).
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